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I feeUt would be a grave error to follow the formula estab•
lished b,y the majority. Such a formula is not consistent
with the Dinuba case nor with the best interests of the general
public.
Plaintiff and appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied
February17, 1954. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the
petition. should be granted.

[L. A. Nu. 22570.

In Bank. Jan. 22, 1954.]

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Appellant, v. SOUTHERN
COUNTIES GAS COMPANY OF CALIFORNIA (a
Corporation), Respondent.
[1]

Franc)!.ises-Oha.rg~s

and J'§Jrcentages.....:.ij.ross Receipts.---Gross
receipts of gas company which was granted .franchise by county
to lfl.y its pipes in public xoads and highways arise from all
of its operative property, whether or not such property is
located on· rights of way, public or· private, or on land owned
or leased by it or on.land owned by othk<rs.'
[2~ Id~...,...ob.arges a'nd Percentages- Operative J?roperty.-'-Operative property of gas company whieh. was ·granted ·franchise
by eounty t() lay its pipes in p~blic roads and highways consists of various kinds of real and personal property, including
land leased or owned, compressor stations and · equipment,
meter statiuns and equipment, gas production equipment, pipe
lines, valves, general qffice buildings, warehouses, transportation equipment, laboratory equipment, etc.
f3] Id.-'-Oharges and Percentages-Meet of Broughton Aet.Sinee the 2. per cent charge due county for frane:Uise. grl:tnted
gas company by county ordinance pursuant to the Broughton
:Act (Stats.1R05, P> 7'7'7; now Puk.Util. Code, §§ 0001-6071}
applies only to gross receipts arising from use of franehisfl,
gross .receipts.arising from operative property.oth.er than fran-.
chise must be. excluded from. base to which the 2 per. cent
charge applies.
[4] Id.-Oharges and Pe~entages-,..Gr9ss Reeeipts..__Since every
dollal:' invested in operative property of franchise holder earns
·
of gross receipts, such receipts are attributable
item or class of operative property according to
[lj See Cal.Jur; 10-Yr.Supp. (1950 Rev.), Franchises, §14a.
MeR, Dig; ·Reference: [1-12] Franchises, §21.
42 C.2d....:.S
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dollars invested in it, and factors in proration must be measured in same terms; since gross receipts are measured in
dollars, the property giving rise to them must be measured in
dollars.
[5] !d.-Charges and Percentages-Gross Receipts.-Gross receipts
that arise from use of franchises are gross receipts attributable
to that part of property using public rights of way pursuant
to franchises.
[6] !d.-Charges and Percentages-Gross Receipts-Apportionment.-Gross receipts of gas company attributable to various
rights of way may be apportioned between public and private
rights of way according to mileage, not necessarily as an exclusive method, but as a practicable one, where county which
granted the franchise for public rights of way does not question this method of apportionment and adopts it in its own
computations.
[7] !d.-Charges and Percentages-Effect of Broughton Act.-In
computing base for 2 per cent charge due county for franchises granted gas company to lay its pipes in public roads
and highways, deductions must be made for gross receipts
attributed to its office and other general facilities, part of
its distribution system on private property owned by consumers and not under lease by company, and part of its distribution system on private property owned or leased by company, since failure to make such deductions would repudiate
principle that company's gross receipts arise from all of its
operative property and that gross receipts from all operative
property other than franchises must be excluded from base
on which 2 per cent charge is computed.
[8] !d.-Charges and Percentages-Effect of Broughton Act.Principle that county is not entitled to any part of gross receipts from utility property not subject to franchise charges is
applicable to all operative property of utility not subject to
such charges, and is not restricted to its generating plants or
other producing agencies.
[9] !d.-Charges and Percentages-Property Affected.-Operative
property (such as office buildings and warehouses) other than
generating plants, powerhouses, and distributing system consisting of poles and wires, are just as much an integral part
of an electric or gas system as generating plants, powerhouses
and private rights of way, and if it is absurd to say that any
integral part of such a system is entitled to credit for whole
of its gross receipts, it is equally absurd to say that any
number less than the whole is so entitled.
[10] !d.-Charges and Percentages-Property Affected.-If all of
property other than generating plants and powerhouses could
reasonably be regarded as entirely part of utility's distribution
system, it would not follow that gross receipts attributable
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thereto should be included in fund to which 2 per cent charge
for use of franchise applies, since gross receipts from parts of
distribution system that are not subject to franchise charges
are not subject to 2 per cent charge.
[11] !d.-Charges and Percentages-Property Excluded.-Gross
receipts attributable to private rights and gross receipts attributable to private property not located on rights of way
are separately excluded from base to which 2 per cent franchise charge applies, because they arise from property not
subject to franchise charges, and such exclusions do not constitute double deduction for same purpose.
[12] !d.-Charges and Percentages-Effect of Broughton Act.By its express terms the Broughton Act allows utility to retain
100 per cent of its gross receipts from its private property
not subject to franchise charges as well as 98 per cent of
its gross receipts arising from use of franchises; it is not
2 per cent of its gross receipts but only 2 per cent of its
gross receipts "arising from the use" of franchises that is
exacted as payment for use of such franchises.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Paul Nourse, Judge. Affirmed.
Action for declaratory relief and an accounting.
ment for defendant affirmed.

Judg-

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, A. Curtis Smith and
Gerald G. Kelly, Assistant County Counsel, and John H.
Larson, Deputy County Counsel, for Appellant.
LeRoy M. Edwards, Oscar C. Sattinger and Frank P.
Doherty for Respondent.
Louis W. Myers and O'Melveny & Myers, as Amici Curiae
on behalf of Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-This appeal involves the same basic problems as those presented in City of San Diego v. Southern
Calif. Tel. Corp., ante, p. 110 [266 P.2d 14].
Defendant is a public utility engaged in purchasing and
selling illuminating gas. It produces a small amount of the
gas it sells. Its system is an integrated one and extends
through six counties, including the County of Los Angeles.
It holds franchises granted by these counties and many cities
therein. By this action for declaratory relief and an accounting, plaintiff seeks a judgment establishing the basis on which
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defendant must compute the amount due for four franchises
granted it by plaintiff to lay its pipes in the public roads,
streets, and highways in the county. Each franchise was
granted by a separate ordinance pursuant to the Broughton
Act. (Stats. 1905, p. 777, now Pub. Util. Code, §§ 6001-6071.)
Section 3 of that act fixes the amount that must be paid for
the franchises at "two per cent (2%) of the gross annual
receipts of the person, partnership or corporation to whom
the franchise is awarded, arising from its use, operation or
possession.'' Each ordinance contains substantially the same
provision. 1 Defendant filed statements and made payments
for the years 1936-1939, which plaintiff claims were incorrect.
Although this case is based on statements and figures for
1939, it will control all payments due from 1936 to the termination of each franchise. There is no dispute as to the
figures in the accounting processes or what they represent
and no dispute as to the end result for the other years once
it is determined which of the accounting methods is correct.
The trial court made findings and entered judgment sustaining defendant's computations and return of the amount due.·
Plaintiff appeals, contending that the judgment is not in
accord with section 3 of the Broughton Act as construed by
this court in County of Tulare v. City of Dinuba (1922), 188
Cal. 664 [206 P. 983].
Defendant made the following computation of the amount
due plaintiff for 1939, the year selected by the parties for
presenting the issues:
From its total capital, $31,216,087.13, defendant deducted
its intangibles, $152,351.98, leaving $31,063,735.15 as its total
investment in operative property, i. e., property used and
useful in purchasing, producing, and distributing gas. It
then segregated the amount invested in property not on rights
of way, public or private, $9,955,707.06, and the amount
invested in facilities on all rights of way, public and private,
$21,108,028.09. Defendant then divided its total gross receipts, $9,620,838.45, by its total investment in operative
property, $31,063,735.15, which gave $0.309713 of gross receipts per dollar invested. The amount invested in operative
property on all rights of way, public and private, $21,108,1
0rdinance 500 (New Series) is typical. It provides: " . . . the said
grantee and his or its successors or assigns shall, during the life of said
franchise, pay to the county of Los Angeles . . . two per cent (2%) of
the gross annual receipts of such grantee, and his or its successors or
assigns, arising from the use, operation or possession of said franchise."
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028.09, was then multiplied by $0.309713, which gave a total
of $6,537,430.70 as the gross receipts arising from the use
of rights of way. Defendant then prorated this amount between public and private rights of way on a mileage basis.
Defendant uses 3,249.225 miles of rights of way; 2,969.673
miles thereof, or 91.3963 per cent, are public rights of way.
The amount of gross receipts attributable to all rights of way,
$6,537,430.70, was then multiplied by 91.3963 per cent, the
percentage of miles of right of way subject to franchises,
which gave $5,974,969.77 as the amount of gross receipts
attributable to such rights of way. Of the 2,969.673 miles
of such rights of way, 456.829 miles or 15.3831 per cent are
public rights of way in Los Angeles County. Multiplying
$5,974,969.77 by 15.3831 per cent gave $919,135.57 as the
gross receipts arising from the use of the franchises granted
by plaintiff. Two per cent of that amount is $18,382.60, the
charge for 1939 for the use of such franchises.
The foregoing computations were based on the following
principles, which defendant maintains, and which we agree
(see City of San Diego v. So~dhern Cal. Tel. Corp., ante, p. 110
l266 P.2d 14] ), are in accord with the principles enunciated
or implicit in the opinion of this court in the Tulare case:
[1] 1. Defendant's gross receipts arise from all of its
operative property, whether or not such property is located
on rig·hts of way, public or private, or on land owned or
leased by it or on land owned by others.
[2] 2. Defendant's operative property consists of various
kinds of real and personal property, including land leased
or owned, compressor stations and equipment, meter stations
and equipment, regulator stations and equipment, gas production equipment, pipe lines, valves, general office buildings,
warehouses, transportation equipment, laboratory equipment,
etc. Pipe lines and appurtenances on public and private rights
of way are but a component part of defendant's over-all
system.
[3] 3. Since the 2 per cent charge applies only to gross
receipts arising from the use of the franchises, gross receipts
arising from operative property other than franchises must
be excluded from the base to which the 2 per cent charge
applies.
[4] 4. As in rate making, there is a relationship between
the value of the property and the amount it earns; the dollars
invested in the property produce the dollars that form the
gross receipts. Since every dollar invested in operative prop-
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crty earns an equal part of the gross receipts, gross receipts
are attributed to a particular item or class of operative
property according to the dollars invested in it. Moreover,
the factors in the proration must be measured in the same
terms, and since the gross receipts are measured in dollars,
the property giving rise to them must be measured in dollars.
(City of San Diego v. Southern Cal. Tel. Corp., ante, p. llO
[266 P.2d 14] .) Although this court's opinion in the
Tulare case did not specify how the gross receipts were to
be apportioned between the property on various rights of
way and other property, the method here described is the
only feasible method of making that apportionment and was
used on the retrial of the Tulare case (87 Cal.App. 744,
745-7 46). It is fair, practical, readily understood, and easily
verified.
[5] 5. Gross receipts that arise from the use of the franchises are the gross receipts attributable to that part of the
property using the public rights of way pursuant to the
franchises.
['6] 6. Gross receipts attributable to the various rights
of way are apportioned between public and private rights of
way according to mileage, "not necessarily as an exclusive
method,'' but as a practicable one, as suggested in the Tulare
case. ( 188 Cal. 664, 681.) Defendant could have made this
apportionment according to the amounts invested in rights
of way as in ( 4) above (City of San Diego v. Sotdhern Cal.
Tel. Corp., ante, pp. llO, 122, 125-126 [266 P.2d 14]),
but plaintiff raises no question as to this method of apportioning gross receipts between rights of way and, in fact, adopts
it in its own computations.
[7] Plaintiff contends that in arriving at the base to which
the 2 per cent charge applies, defendant and the trial court
erred in deducting all gross receipts attributable to (1) its
office and other general facilities; (2) the part of its distribution system on private property owned by consumers and
not under lease by defendant ; ( 3) the part of its distribution
system on private property owned or leased by defendant.
Since this contention would not permit the allocation of
any of defendant's gross receipts to the foregoing classes
of property, it necessarily involves a repudiation of the
principle that defendant's gross receipts arise from all of its
operative property and that gross receipts arising from all
operative property other than franchises must be excluded
from the base on which the 2 per cent charge is computed.
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Plaintiff would justify this repudiation on the grounds that
the Tulare case decided that the total gross receipts of a public
utility can only be divided into two categories: ( 1) that which
is credited to its distribution system and (2) that which is
credited to its production system; that the gross receipts
attributable to its distribution system constitutes the fund
from which the 2 per cent charg~ shall be ascertained; 'that
the only gross receipts of defendant from its operative property that can be attributed to its production system and therefore excluded from the fund from which the 2 per cent charge
is ascertained is the $134,111.96 investment in facilities for
manufacturing the small amount of gas it produces and does
not buy from others; and that the only gross receipts of
defendant attributable to its distribution system that are not
subject to the 2 per cent charge are the gross receipts attributable to the use of private rights of way. In support of
this contention, plaintiff cites the following language from
the Tulare case :
"The gross receipts of this defendant accrue from two
distinct agencies. One is the generating plants or powerhouses of the company, located in three separate counties;
the other is the distributing system. . . . The first step in
this accounting should be to determine as a question of fact
what proportion of the total annual gross receipts of the
public utility should be justly credited to its distribution
system over various rights of way, ag distinguished from
its power plants or other producing agencies.'' (188 Cal.
673, 681.)
This language, however, must be read in the light of the
conclusions this court had reached as a basis for the steps
in the accounting. Among these conclusions were: ''The
corporation's gross receipts, to refer to the language of the
Act arise from the 'use, operation or possession' not alone
of these franchises over the streets and highways, but likewise from the use, operation, or possession of the powerhouses and private rights of way. The two last named are
not subject to any franchise charges and the county or
municipality is not entitled under the law to any part of
the gross receipts attributable to these privately owned parts
of the system." ( 188 Cal. 673-67 4.) It should be noted that
the reason for the conclusion that the county or municipality
was not entitled to any part of the gross receipts attributable
to powerhouses and private rights of way, was that the company's gross receipts arise, not alone from the "use . . . "
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of the franchise, but from the use of powerhouses and private
rights of way, which are not subject to any franchise charges.
[8] It is clear from the opinion in the Tulare case that the
principle that this court there enunciated was that the county
was not entitled to any part of the gross receipts from utility
property not subject to franchise charges. The gross receipts
attributable to generating plants, powerhouses, and private
rights of way were excluded, not because the court regarded
them as the only source of gross receipts other than the use
of franchises, but because they were privately owned parts
of the system not subject to any franchise charges. (See,
also, City of San Die[!O v. Southern Cal. Tel. Corp., ante; City
of Monrovia v. Southern Counties Gas Co., 111 Cal.App. 659
[296 P. 117] ; Ocean Park Pier Amusement Corp. v. Santa
Monica, 40 Cal.App.2d 76 [104 P.2cl 668, 879] .) Since
that reason applies with equal force to all operative property
of the company not subject to any franchise charges, it cannot
reasonably be implied that this court meant that only operative property of the kind mentioned contributes to gross
receipts. That such an implication is absurd is apparent
from the statement, ''The absurdity of the position that any
integral part of an electric distributing system like this is
entitled to credit for the whole of the earnings from deliveries
and sales in a given county or municipality when a large
part of such service is over parts of the system not subject
to such franchise permit may be shown by various illustrations." (188 Cal. 67 4.) [9] Operative property other than
generating plants, powerhouses, and the distributing system
consisting of poles and wires, are just as much an integral
part of an electric or gas system as generating plants, powerhouses and private rights of way. Office buildings to house
engineers and executive and administrative staff, warehouses,
transportation equipment, communication equipment, meter
devices, laboratory equipment and other facilities are all
essential to an electric or gas company's operations and all
contribute to its gross receipts. If it is absurd to say that
any integral part of such a system is entitled to credit for
the whole of its gross receipts, it is equally absurd to say
that any number less than the whole is so entitled.
Plaintiff's contention is based on the erroneous conclusion that in the Tulare case this court regarded all property of a public utility other than generating plants and
powerhouses as part of its distributing system. This court
was there concerned, not with labels or a division of the
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property into pr<Hhwing system and distributing system, but
with property that was alHl property that was not subject
to any franchise c:harge. 'l'he li!'bitrary (•)assifieation of land,
office buildings, warehouses, garages, eonstruction equipment,
automotive equipment, laboratory and other equipment as
entirely part of the distribution system rather than as part
of the production system or as part of both production and
distribution systems or as "other [revenue] producing agencies" ( 188 Cal. 664, 681), would not only be unreasonable
but pointless. [10] Even if all of the property other than
generating plants and powerhouses could reasonably be regarded as entirely part of the utility's distribution system, it
would not follow that gross receipts attributable thereto should
be included in the fund to which the 2 per cent charge applies.
Thus, property in private rights of way is admittedly part
of the distribution system. Yet this court in the Tulare case
made it abundantly clear that gross receipts attributable to
such property were not subject to the 2 per cent charge,
since such property was "not subject to any franchise
charges.'' For the same reason gross receipts from any
other parts of the distribution system that are not subject
to franchise charges are not subject to the 2 per cent charge.
Plaintiff does not quarrel with the capital investment
method as such for allocating gross receipts to a particular
item or class of operative property in it. In fact, it uses
that method itself in its own apportionment between production and distribution. Plaintiff contends that although this
method is ''plausible'' and ''entirely correct,'' there is no
occasion to use it as defendant uses it and that unless it is
limited to the use plaintiff makes of it to apportion gross
receipts between production and distribution, defendant will
get a double deduction for the same purpose: (1) the deduction taken by the proration on a mileage basis for gross receipts attributable to private rights of way and (2) the deduction taken, before the proration on a mileage basis, for operative property not located on rights of way. This contention
assumes the validity of the distinction, discussed at length
above, that plaintiff would make between production and distribution and the conclusions it would draw therefrom, and
is simply another way of asserting that only gross receipts
attributable to generating plants and private rights of way
can be excluded from the base to which the 2 per cent charge
applies. There is no double deduction for the same purpose.
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[11] Gross receipts attributable to private rights of way and
gross receipts attributable to private property not located on
rights of way are separately excluded from the base to which
the 2 per cent charge applies, without duplication or overlapping, and for the same reason-they arise from property
not subject to any franchise charges.
[12] Plaintiff would also justify its repudiation of the
principle that defendant's gross receipts arise from all of
its operative property and that gross receipts arising from
all operative property other than franchises must be excluded
from the base on ·which the 2 per cent charge is computed,
on the following theory: The Broughton Act allows the
utility to retain 98 per cent of its total gross receipts as
the percentage applicable to its private property and requires
it to pay to cities and counties 2 per cent of its gross receipts
(less those attributable to private rights of way) for the use
of public property; if it were allowed to take any more of
its gross receipts as applicable to its private property, it
would get a double deduction: (1) the amount so taken and
(2) the 98 per cent it is allowed to retain. This theory
ignores the limitation in the Broughton Act that the 2 per
cent charge applies, not to defendant's total gross receipts,
but only to its gross receipts "arising from the use" of the
franchise. Thus, by its express terms the Broughton Act
allows the utility to retain not only 98 per cent but 100 per
cent of its gross receipts from its private property not subject
to franchise charges, as well as 98 per cent of its gross receipts
arising from the use of the franchises. It is not 2 per cent
of its total gross receipts but only 2 per cent of its gross
receipts "arising from the use" of the franchises that is
exacted as a payment for the use of such franchises. The
foregoing theory of plaintiff's is simply a slight modification,
purportedly made in obedience to the Tulare case, o:f another
contention suggested by it that the Tulare case should be
disregarded and that there should be only a proration o:f
the entire gross receipts between rights of way on a mileage
basis. 2 As we have pointed out at some length above, and
2
In advancing this contention Jllaintiff makes the specious argument
that gross receipts means all receipts without deduction and that there
is no more ;justification for deducting a cent from gross receipts than
there would be to deduct manufacturing costs from the retail price of
gas appliances in computing a sales tax based on gross receipts. There
is no deduction here of manufacturing costs, cost of gas, costs of operation or other costs. Gross receipts that are attributed to the use of
franchises and to other operative property are still gross receipts. There
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in City of San Diego v. Southern Cal. Tel. Corp., ante,
pp. 110, 124 [266 P.2cl 14], that is not what the statute provides. There is no more justification for prorating the total
gross receipts between rights of way than there would be for
attributing the total gross
to each franchise used
and requiring the utility to pay 2 per cent of its total gross
receipts to each of the numerous cities and counties
the franchises.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
It appears to me that the gas company formula, accepted
by the majority, attempts to deduct every possible dollar of
invested capital from the distribution system before they
compute the value of the distribution system attributable
to either public or private ways. In this manner they seek
to base the county's share on little more than pipe in the
g?·ouncl. This is a complete misconception of the Broughton
.Act and its interpretation by this court in the Dinuba case.
(County of Tulare v. City of Dinuba, 188 Cal. 664 [206 P.
983},)
The Broughton Act provides that the utility ''shall during
the life of the franchise pay to the county or municipality
two percent (2%) of the gross annual receipts of the grantee
arising from the use, operation, or possession of the franchise.'' In giving an interpretation to the meaning of these
·words this court, in the Dinuba case, supra, stated (p. 673)
that the corporation's gross receipts "arise from the 'use,
operation or possession,' not alone of these franchises over
the streets and highways, but likewise from the use, operation, or possession of the power-houses and private rights
of way. The two last named are not subject to any franchise
charges and the county or municipality is not entitled under
the law to any part of the gross receipts attributable to these
is no deduction from gross receipts hut :c proration of gross receipts
between property that is suhjcct to franchise charges and property th3t
is not, ;just as there is no deduction from gross receipts in plaintiff's
proration of gross receipts between rights of way. Pl::Lintiff 's argument
would necessarily lead to the conclusion that there can be no proration
of gross receipts, even hetween rights of way, and that for every franchise granted by each county and city, defendant must pay 2 per cent
of its total gross receipts.
·
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privately owned parts of the system." This court then went
on to say (p. 681) that "The first step in this accounting
should be to determine as a question of fact what proportion
of the total amount of gross receipts of the public utility
should be justly accredited to its distributing system over
vari01ts r(qhts of way, as distinguished from its power plants
or other producing agenc·ies.
''This will establish the fund from which the percentage
of earnings 'arising from the use, operation or possession'
of the various franchise easements shall be ascertained.
''The percentage of this fund to be apportioned to the
respective public franchises will not include the proportion
of such gross receipts of the distributing system as are attributable to the use of private rights of way occupied by
the utility, as such part of the system is not subject to
franchise charge." (Emphasis added.)
The clear import of this language is that we are first to
deduct from gross revenue that amount attributable to the
production system. This leaves us with the amount of gross
revenue attributable to the entire distribution system. We
then must determine what proportion of these earnings of
the entire distribution system to attribute to the distribution
system on public ways as contrasted to the distribution system
located on private ways. Such was clearly this court's view
in the Dinuba case when it said (p. 676) : "The reasonable
construction of the language used is that each county or
municipality is entitled to its percentage of the gross earnings arising from the use of its highway, in the proportion
that the receipts arising from the use of such highways bears
to the receipts attributable to all the rights of way of the
entire system.'' In determining what share of the distribution earnings to attribute to the public ways and what share
to the private ways this court felt that the relative mileage
of each was the most appropriate basis. This was illustrated
by the following statement on page 681 : ''We have adopted
this appropriation, to the various rights of way, according
to cnileage, not necessarily as an exclusive method of distribution of the gross receipts, but as a practicable one where
the contribnt?:on of the various franchise easements to the
gross earnings cannot be otherwise determined. . . . There
may be instances where the extent or value of the distributing
system over a given right of way may indicate its earning
capacity; or where the service of lateral lines may be differentiated from that of main conduits in the value of their use
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of the easements. In such cases these conditions should be
taken into account. But where, as will often happen, contribution to the earnings of the various rights of way is general and indistinguishable, we can see no reason why the
proportionate mileage basis should not be used in apportioning
the statutory percentage of gross receipts."
(Emphasis
added.)
rrhus we see that once we have determined what proportion
of the gross receipts is attributable to the entire distribution
system, we must find some method of determining what
proportion is attributable to private ways and what portion
is attributable to public ways. The most practical method
of so doing is by use of the relative mileage basis. An example
of its application was given by this court in the Dinuba case
(p. 676) where it said: "It may be assumed that the distributing· system covers six hundred miles of easements. The
proportion of the gross receipts derived from and chargeable
to the use of the distributing system should be credited to
this entire mileage. One-third of this mileage may extend
over private rights of way which are not subject to any
franchise liability. The remaining two-thirds of the mileagr
covered by county franchises is entitled to two-thirds of the
two per cent of the gross amount, and each county is entitled
to the percentage of this two-thirds in the proportion that
the mileage of its franchises bears to the total mileage covered
by all the franchises." (Emphasis added.)
By its language this court, in the Dinuba case, made it
extremely clear that the 2 per cent was to be taken from that
portion of the gross receipts of the total distribution system
attributable to the distribution system on public ways; that
the exact earnings of each mile in the system cannot always
be accurately determined; that the value of rach portion of
the distribution system is not necessarily indicative of its
earning capacity and therefore the best method of prorating
the earnings of the entire distribution system between public
and private ways is to use the mileage basis. All of this
makes it apparent that this court established a rather simple
formula whereby we first determine what portion of the total
gross receipts is attributable to the distribution system, and
then, as the best practical method of prorating these total
distribution receipts between public and private ways, we use
the relative mileage basis. From the gross receipts attributable to public ways the governmental bodies granting the
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franchises are entitled to 2 per cent of their proportionate
interest. \;Yhat could be clearer~
As stated by the District Court of Appeal in its opinion
in this case (see County of Los Angeles v. Southern Counties
Gas Co., (Cal.App.), 259 P.2d 665): "The Broughton
Act recognized the justice of allowing a public utility a
credit for its private property by exempting 98 per cent of
the gross receipts from the franchise charge. The Dinuba
case went a step further in allowing an apportionment of
the 2 per cent toll so as to eliminate any charge for that
proportion of the mileage over private rights of way. The
gas company is not satisfied to accept the benefits granted
by both the Broughton Act and the Dinuba decision, but
in addition thereto it takes the additional deduction for the
facilities located on private property by the utilization of
the so-called 'capital investment method' of accounting."
The formula proposed by the county and accepted by the
District Court of Appeal follows the pattern as established
in the Dinuba case. The gas company, on the other hand,
seeks to use a combination formula which includes some of
the suggestions of tho Dinuba case but which also includes
several other calculations designed to reduce to a bare minimum the amount due the county. For a clearer understanding of the gas company's departure from the formula in the
Dinuba case, it may be well at this time to compare the
methods used by the county and by the gas company.
To begin with it should be noted that both the county and
the gas company are in accord as to certain calculations even
though they are made at different stages of the respective
formulae. As a starting point both the county and gas
company agree that in 1939 total invested capital equalled
$31,216,081.13. From this both deduct intangibles, capital in
general facilities and office and capital invested in production
facilities. This leaves a total of $28,548,380.17 as that portion
of the total capital which is invested in the distribution
system. Once the extent of the distribution system, as contrasted to the producing system, has been ascertained, the
next step should (under the Dinuba case) be to determine
what proportion of the gross receipts can be attributed to
the total distribution system. This is required under the
Dinuba formula and is done by the county. Thus the county
calculates that the amount of capital invested in distribution
is 99.1306 per cent as contrasted to .8694 per cent invested
in production facilities. Since 99.1306 per cent of the pro-

Jan.1954]

CouNTY OF

L. A. v.

SouTHERN ETC. GAs Co.

143

[42 C.2d 129; 266 P.2d 27]

cluction and distribution capital is invested in distribution
facilities it follows that 99.1306 per cent of the gross receipts
should be credited to the entire distribution system. This is
the logical approach, this is the reasoning of the Dinuba case
and this is the formula used by the county, but the gas
company seeks still another deduction. Rather than determine the amount of capital invested in the entire distribution system they seek a figure which includes only the distribution capital invested in rights of way. To do this they
deduct $7,556,603.15, which is the value of all distribution
capital on consumer's property or on leased property. It is
in this major respect that the gas company formula departs
from the Dinuba case and differs from the county formula.
By so doing the gas company deducts over 25 per cent of
the value of the entire distribution system before computing
the gross receipts attributable to the distribution system. This
leaves only the capital invested in rights of way and has the
effect of basing the gross receipts attributable to the distribution system on little more than the value of the pipe in the
ground. It is a departure from the strict mileage formula
established by the decision in the Dinuba case.
The net result of the gas company formula is that it does
not compute the gross receipts for the entire distribution
system as required by the Dinuba case, but it tries to limit
the fund to those receipts attributable only to rights of way.
It attempts to exclude some of the distribution system which
is located on private property in this preliminary calculation,
when such exclusion should properly be made only on the
mileage basis when the ratio of public to private system is
determined.
As l1as already been pointed out in the Dinuba case the
value of an isolated portion of the distributing system is not
necessarily indicative of its earning capacity. Certain portions which are new may have a greater value but far less
earning capacity than some of the older sections which have
little book value but a great deal of earning power. The
terminus of a gas conduit may be one of the most extensive
parts of the line but that does not mean that the meters and
terminal equipment account for most all the earnings and
that the transporting conduit earns little or nothing. Thus
we can see that while the amount of capital invested in an
entire system may be some indication of its earnings, we
cannot segregate isolated portions of a system and determine
that its dollar value is a correct measurement of its earning
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povver. For this reason this court in the Dinuba case pre£ 'rred to compute all the gross receipts attributable to the
entire distribution system and then prorate them between
the public and private ways on a mileage basis rather than
d ·ducting part of such system on a dollar value basis. This
is necessary since as a practical matter the contributions of
the various portions of the distribution system to the gross
distribution receipts cannot otherwise be determined.
The majority fails to recognize the fact that some portions
of the distribution system which are low in dollar value may
have an earning power as great or greater than other portions
which have a high book value. Based on this misconception
it states that ''As in rate making there is a relationship
between the value of the property and the amount it earns;
the dollars invested in the property produce the dollars that
form the gross receipts. Since every dollar invested in operative property rarns an equal part of the gross receipts, gross
rec:'ipts are attributed to a particular item or class of operative property according to the dollars invested in it.'' Granted
that there is a relationship between the value of a corporation's property and the amount it earns, we must recognize
the limitations of such a broad generalization. Thus it might
be said that there is a relationship between the value of the
rntire production system and the extent of its earning power;
or it might be said that there is a relationship between the
value of the entire distribution system and the amount it
rarns; but such a general relationship between the value of
the proprrty and the degree of earning power cannot be
carried too far. l<'or example, assume that every building
on Block "A" has a direct conduit connection with the main
gas line; that each conduit has a book value of $100; that
one of the buildings serviced is a restaurant using gas ranges;
that one of the buildings is a bakery using gas ovens; that
two of the buildings are unoccupird ; that one of the buildings
is occupied by a frozen food locker; and that one of the
buildings is occupied by a meat market. From this type of
factual situation it can clearly be seen that the amount of
gas eonsumed by the various customers serviced will vary to
a considrrable extent rven though the value of the conduit
into each building has the same $100 book value. Thus we
s·'e that the earning power of the various conduits will vary
in spite of the fact that the same number of dollars is invested
in rach; and thrrefore the g~neralization that earnings have
a relationship to dollars invested has its limitations.
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Granting that there is a relationship between the dollars
invested in an entire system and its earnings, there is not
always an accurate relationship between the value of a particular portion of the system and its earnings. In view of
this it is not correct to say (as the majority has) that "every
dollar invested in operative property earns an equal part
of the gross receipts," and that "gross receipts are attributed
to a particular item or class of operative property according
to the dollars invested in it." (Emphasis added.) By this
reasoning the majority (following the theory advanced by
the gas company) contends that the earning power of the
public ways must be limited to the actual value of the investments in rights of ways after various other portions of the
distribution system have been deducted. Thus they compute
the dollars earned on a particular portion of the distribution
system on a dollar investment basis even though such a method
is only feasible when applied to an entire system as contrasted
to an isolated part.
These limitations were recognized by this court in the
Dinuba case when it stated (p. 682): "There may be instances where the extent or value of the distributing system
over a given right of way may indicate its earning capacity;
. . . But where, as will often happen, contribution to the
earnings of the various rights of way is general and indistinguishable, we can see no reason why the proportionate
mileage basis should not be used in apportioning the statutory
percentage of grm;s receipts.'' Thus in order to compute
the gross receipts arising from the use, operation or possession
of the public franchise we must first determine the gross
receipts of the entire distribution system and then on a mileage
basis prorate these gross receipts between public and private
ways.
By seeking to deduct the $7,556,603.15 as part of the distribution system on consumers' property or on leased property
and later seeking to deduct 8.603 per cent of the mileage
as being located on private ways the gas company is attempting a form of double deduction. The portion of the distribution system located at the terminus of each line is high in
value ($7,556,603.15) but low in mileage so the gas company
seeks to deduct this portion on a dollar basis. The other
portions of the distribution system on private ways do not
account for as much value (approximately $2,400,000) so
the gas company is willing to compute these portions on a
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mileage basis. Thus the gas company attempts to divide
the distribution system on private ways into two parts. The
one part having a high value ($7,556,603.15) they seek to
deduct on a dollar basis. The other portions having a lower
dollar value (approximately $2,400,000) but a higher mileage
value they seek to deduct on a mileage basis. Actually the
gas company is only entitled to one deduction from the receipts of the distribution system and that is a single deduction
for the proportion of the distribution system on private ways.
This should include that portion of the system running over
private ways owned by the company, private ways leased by
the company, private ways merely used by the company
and all other forms of private ways including the conduits
and equipment running to each consumer. Why should there
be a distinction between private ways on consumers' property and other private ways~ It is all part of the distribution
system and the gas company will be credited with that portion
of the distribution system on all private ways on a mileage
basis.
By these calculations the gas company has reduced the
total of distribution receipts to $6,537,430.70 rather than the
total of $9,537,137.16 reached under the county formula.
Since 91.3963 per cent of the distribution mileage is on public
ways the gross receipts fund attributable to public ways,
from which the 2 per cent is to be taken, should total
$8,716,590.49 instead of $5,974,969.77 as computed by the
company. The net result of the gas company's double deduction is that for 1939 the county of Los Angeles having 15.3831
per cent of the public ways would only be entitled to
$18,382.60 rather than $26,817.63.
There can be no doubt that the Broughton Act as well
as the Dinuba case intended the 2 per cent to be taken from
the gross receipts attributable to the distribution system after
the proportion attributable to private ways had been deducted.
However, the manner of deducting or excluding such items
must be consistent. It is not proper to exclude the part of
the distribution system located on private property on a
dollar invested basis and the balance on a mileage basis.
The term gross receipts >vas adequately defined by the District Court of Appeal (County of Los Angeles v. Southern
Cmtnties Gas Co., (Cal.App.) 259 P.2d 665) when it said:
"No authority has been found to define the term 'gross receipts' to mean anything other than the total without deduction ; it means 'all receipts on business beginning and ending
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within this state.' (Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Roberts, 176
Cal. 183, 189 [167 P. 845] .) The phrase is 'plain language
which requires no interpretation . . . "perfectly plain, unequivocal language'' . . . it must be taken in its plain sense
without limitation or deduction save as expressly modified by the Legislature.' (Bekins Van Lines, Inc. v. Johnson,
21 Cal. 2d 135, 140 [130 P.2d 421].) Gross receipts mean all
receipts arising from or growing out of the employment of
the corporation's capital in its designated business. (Robertson v. Johnson, 55 Cal.App.2d 610 [131 P.2d 388].) Is there
any doubt then that the Legislature intended for the utility
to pay as a toll for the use of public highways on which to
lay its pipes, tracks or cables, 2 per cent of its gross receipts~
'' 'l'hese conclusions are fortified by the doctrine of strict
construction. The basic franchise ordinance (No. 1107, New
Series, 1924) provides that 'the franchise is granted upon each
and every condition contained herein, and in the ordinance
granting the same and shall ever be strictly construed against
the grantee.' ·when a franchise provides for the protection
of the public interest, it is a fair assumption that the board
of supervisors endeavored to perform its duty as trustee
for the public and that the provisions were inserted for the
purpose of securing for the public all substantial advantages.
(38 Am.Jnr. 214.) It is a general principle of construction
that franchises granted by the state to private persons or corporations must be construed most strongly in favor of the public. If a doubt arises, nothing is to be taken by implication
as against public rights. (Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 160
Cal. 30, 38 [116 P. 722] ; Sacramento v. Pam:fic Gas & Elec.
Co., 173 Cal. 787, 791 [161 P. 978].)
''From all that is said above it is unavoidable that the
franchise must be construed strictly in favor of the county
and as so construed respondent should pay its full 2 per
cent of its gross receipts each year of the life of its franchise
with no deductions except those attributable to production
capital and the proportion of the distribution system belonging
to the utility."
It would also appear that the cases cited by the majority
and the gas company were adequately distinguished by the
District Court of Appeal ( Connty of Los Angeles v. Southern
Co1mties Gas Co., s1tpm, (Cal.App.) 259 P.2d 665) in the
following discussion: "Ocean Park Pier Amusement Corp. v.
City of Santa Monica, 40 Cal.App.2d 76 [104 P.2d 668, 879],
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cited by the gas company in support of its position, is readily
distinguishable. In that case the city exacted the full statutory toll for the use of its own property and in addition
sought to exact a charge for the use of the corporation's property. It was therefore properly held that no franchise payment need be made for the use of private property with respect to which no public property was contributed or used.
In the case at bar, however, the gas company has consistently
utilized public property in its operations and of course could
not operate for an instant without public franchises, but the
record discloses no attempt by appellant 'to include in the
grant, land over which it had no proprietary interest,' as was
true of the City of Santa Monica in the last cited authority,
page 86.
"Respondent cites also City of lJionrom:a v. Southern
Counties Gas Co., 111 Cal.A.pp. 659 [296 P. 117], as authority
for its contention. The court said at page 660, 'In accordance with this method [from the Dinuba decision] the defendant ... [eliminated] that portion of its earnings attributable to the use of its properties located on private property.'
The context of the above sentence, a portion of which respondent quotes, makes it clear that the mileage allocation
formula of the Dinuba decision, under no dispute in the
instant case, is referred to. But in any event, the only issue
involved in the Monrovia action was whether or not the city
was entitled to 2 per cent of the gross receipts collected within
the city, a point not at all involved in the instant controversy.''
If we are to abide by the decision of the Dinuba case,
if we are to insist on a fair and consistent formula without
double deductions, and if we are to construe the franchise
most strongly in favor of the public (as is required by law),
then we must reverse the judgment rendered by the trial
court.
For these reasons I would reverse the judgment.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied February
17, 1954. Carter, ,J., was of the opinion that the petition
should be granted.

